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Abstract 
Determinant factors of the Romanian energy systems’ transformation processes include both positive and negative ones. The 
former refer to European integration, creation of the Single Energy Market, the important number of clients/consumers, the 
energy systems’ performances - the first economic structure integrated with the European ones -, the existing primary energy 
resources etc. The latter include the lack of a coherent domestic industrial policy and the vulnerability of decision makers facing 
external pressures. The Romanian electricity generation structure has modified during the last 23 years. The main coordinates 
comprise: a continuous reduction, nearly to extinction, of the main generation company’s share of the electricity market; 
atomization of the generation sector; privatization of five from eight existing distribution companies; creation of the supply 
segment; and, last but not least, the electricity price liberalization. The paper analyses some of the contradictory tendencies in 
over 20 year late history of the Romanian energy system and draws a series of possible measures to implement in order to 
counteract the negative results.  
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1. Introduction  
This is our hypothesis that we intend to demonstrate as still viable: the electricity industry could become one of 
the pillars of Romania’s economic development. Instead, the absence of a coherent industrial policy, with clearly 
defined priorities, the institutional capacity lack to outrun political and social obstacles, deprived the energy system 
from the necessary investments meant to transform it into an economic growth engine. 
2. Literature review  
Ideological, economic, financial or political determinations generated enormous investments, doubled by no less 
sacrifices, aimed towards restructuring the energy system. There is a huge variety of studies trying to determine if 
practical results sustain the logic of the developed reforms. Hence, the issues confronting the energy field decision 
makers evolved more rapidly than the dedicated literature was able to offer sound solutions. International experience 
has shown that structural changes need long implementation periods, encountering often the opposition of obscure 
interest parties imposing the definition of future energy system configuration. Obviously, the starting point of the 
reform process should be preferably based on a coherent and comprehensive industrial policy. 
Numerous debates are generated by comparative efficiencies of the publicly/privately owned natural monopolies, 
the benefits of the competition driven systems versus the advantages of regulated vertically integrated energy 
systems. An assessment framework of the impact of these transformations upon social welfare is not yet 
unanimously accepted. 
Ott and Hartley (1991) establish the foundations of an interdisciplinary approach that merge economic and 
organizational dimensions of privatization processes. The authors conclude that the assessment of public 
investments reflect extended political objectives including, among others, equity and income redistribution. This 
moots the question whether privatization is desirable, through its effects upon welfare, from a social point of view. 
The authors try to find the means to obtain the maximum price for the state owned companies. They conclude that 
privatization is an apparently simple concept that triggers a whole series of extremely complex issues regarding: the 
market functioning in general, and the capital one in particular; the role of regulation authorities especially when it 
comes to monopolies; the interest parties’ power to influence decisions etc. 
(Pollitt, 1995) finds that economic efficiency of dominant energy companies does not significantly differ 
depending on property categories. The author analyzes also the effects of competition, scale economies, vertical 
structure and regulations upon energy systems’ efficiency. The empirical evidence suggests that all the above 
mentioned factors influence the costs in the same measure, disregarding the property structure. This means that the 
property type is not the only and even not the most important determination factor of a specific energy utility 
efficiency. The author concludes that the literature is not able to demonstrate that property transfer conducts to a 
cost decrease. The comparative analysis of 95 thermo-electrical units from eight different countries didn’t provide 
any evidence of significant differences in efficiency between state and privatized utilities. The results of the study 
show that privatization is able to reduce operation costs on long term taking into account the investment decisions 
but, on short term, given a certain technological endowment, privatization cannot lead to a reduction of electricity 
generation costs. Regarding the transport and distribution there are no evidence nor for short, neither for long term 
cost reduction in the circumstances of a transfer to private property. Generally, in the electrical sector, the most 
important efficiency gains may result from a restructuring process and from a better management of the state owned 
utilities. 
(Buzar, 2007) argues that privatization was doubled by continuous pressures from the international financial 
institutions to increase energy prices. In this respect he quotes (Velody et.al, 2003). Unlike Hungary, Czech 
Republic and Slovakia were less eager to give up the state central control over the energy sector. (Anderson, 2001), 
quoted by Buzar, considers that Czech Republic and Slovakia remained behind their neighboring states in the field 
of energy sector privatization because of onerous interests, nationalist concerns regarding the strategic industries and 
potential impact of higher electricity invoices. Also, the Eastern countries, newly EU integrated, as Lithuania, 
Letonia, Bulgaria and Romania were reluctant in taking radical energy reform measures. This attitude was adopted 
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despite the external pressures especially from the EU institutions, mentions (Balmaceda, 2002). In fact, Buzar 
advocates that the majority of countries have no other political option but to follow a pre-determined path in the 
fields of energy, housing and social welfare. In general, this consists in energy liberalization, reduction of social 
welfare and delegation of social policies to private actors. These processes are supported by a synergic complex 
between global powers and local governments making efforts to convert the neo-liberalism in an unavoidable path 
for the post-socialist transformation. The principles of neo-liberalism are gradually integrated in regulation systems, 
making it very difficult to formulate alternative economic rules. 
(Jamasab, et al., 2005) elaborate an exhaustive, critical study of the existing literature, approaching the energy 
sectors’ reform in developing countries. Their declared aim was to test the extent to what the reality, the empirical 
evidence justify the ideological or economic logic of the reform processes. The authors depart from the hypothesis, 
very questionable in our regard, that the primary impulse for the energy system transformations reflects the lack of 
satisfaction regarding the performances of traditional organization forms and the desire to enhance the efficiency 
and reduce the fiscal drainage from the public sector. Even the authors admit, by referring to Joskow and Rose 
(1989) and to Joskow and Noll (1981) that measuring inefficiency and regulation effects is a very difficult task in 
the particular case of energy systems. A distinction has been made between the determinant factors of the reform 
processes in developed and transition countries. Thus, in the first case, the enhancement of economic and financial 
performances of technologically viable systems was the main driving force of the reform. In the second case, the 
burden of subsidies, the poor quality of services, the weak invoice collection, high network losses constituted, in 
authors’ opinion, the main motives to begin the reform process. Also the authors admit that the intervention of 
international financial institutions accelerated the process. This way, the privatization was performed too soon, 
before taking other imperatively necessary measures such as the establishment of effective regulation authorities or 
the reform of pricing mechanisms. 
3. Research results 
The most important European energy companies prepared themselves intensely to cope with a highly competitive 
environment, through internal restructuring processes (vertical/horizontal integration/separation, diversification of 
activities, decrease of the number of employees etc.), outsourcing of certain activities, creation of new partnerships 
etc. Yet, the most common feature of the European picture is given by mergers and acquisitions, developed by the 
European energy giants. The extension of these activities shows the huge interest to penetrate new markets, either 
through new businesses on a national level, or through geographical expansion.  
The result of this merger and acquisition practices is going to be an energy market dominated by a small number 
of utility giants that diversify their range of services, from electricity and natural gas production and distribution, to 
communication, water and waste management. 
In Romania, the first stage of the energy sector reform was the establishment of the Energy National Regulation 
Authority (ANRE), in 1998. The national electricity company, vertically and horizontally integrated, was state 
owned. The year 1998 encompassed, also, the first vertical separation stage of the Romanian Energy System: the 
separation of the distribution activity, from the generation one. In 2000, the vertical separation was finalized through 
the establishment of Transelectrica, specialized in energy transport, with its market commercial operator (OPCOM). 
The same year, the electricity spot market begun its operation (the day ahead market). In 2001, the distribution 
company Electrica, was horizontally divided into eight separated entities.  
In the next years, between 2002 and 2007, the main energy sector reform objectives envisaged the electricity 
distribution activity crossing from state, to private property. The privatization of these economic units was 
characterized by the lack of public authorities’ capacity to surpass political obstacles (lack of transparency and 
stability of the regulation framework and privatization process, the divergent interests of different interest groups). 
These days, the electricity market liberalization is the main priority of the non-existent energy strategy. 
The main determinant factors of the energy transformation processes include the European integration, the 
creation of the Single Energy market, the important number of clients/consumers, the old energy systems’ 
performances – the first one integrated within the European structures (from 2003), the existing primary energy 
resources, the lack of a coherent industrial policy and the vulnerability of decision makers facing financial 
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institutions external pressures, all of these increasing the attractiveness of the National Energy System for the 
foreign companies.  
The Romanian electricity generation structure has modified in the last 20 years, the main coordinate being the 
continuous reduction, up to extinction, of the contribution of Termoelectrica to the electricity generation market. In 
2011, only half of the electricity generation companies registered profits, among them being mostly the well 
established energy companies as Nuclearelectrica, Hidroelectrica or the energy integrated complexes. 
Eight companies activate on the distribution market. After privatization, five of them are owned by foreign 
capital companies (ENEL, E.On, CEZ). All distribution companies are profitable, especially the foreign ones, who 
registered also the most important employment cuts.  
The electricity supply activity is apparently a part of the electricity value chain. It is a theoretically competitive 
sector, insufficiently monitored by the regulation authority. ANRE is the one responsible for the dominant firm 
abuse prevention, under the circumstances of non compliance with the competition and transparency rules. The 
financial indicators of the implicit energy suppliers, after the successful privatization processes undertaken until the 
year 2007 (not randomly the year of Romania’s European integration) indicate that the declared objectives - more 
efficient activities, state budget contribution growth -, could not accomplished (Badileanu, 2013). The implicit 
suppliers beneficiated from higher prices for the delivered energy, but had weaker financial results than the 
competitive ones. Then, why all those pressures towards the electricity market liberalization (in other words, 
towards the deregulation of the energy prices destined to captive consumers)? Why liberalization implies only the 
enhancement of electricity prices following a pre-established schedule? One of the answers comes with the fact that 
prices on the competitive market where artificially lowered by the numerous bilateral contracts concluded with 
lower prices than the market ones. The beneficiaries of these contracts registered enormous short term profits 
affecting on a very long term the financial health of the generation companies.  
It is obvious that the state institutions were not prepared to monitor and intervene in such circumstances. This 
reform stage of the energy supply market was far from sufficiently prepared from an institutional point of view and 
forced by interest groups. The regulation authority was not capable to insure the supplier’s market transparency, to 
monitor its activities in order to insure that this new market segment is going to constitute a useful instrument for the 
energy market opening.  
Under those circumstances determined, on one hand by the huge short term business pressure (not necessarily in 
a pejorative sense) and, on the other hand, by the continuous decrease of the population income pressure doubled by 
the steadily increased percentage of population expenses with the electricity consumption after 2008. The electricity 
prices and the induced expenses did not stimulate the consumer orientation towards this type of energy. Thus, the 
energy consumption level in Romania situates at less than one third comparative to the EU average.  
The level of energy prices, the income decrease and the disparities existing in their distribution, lead us to a 
diminished consumption and decreased capacity utilization, to an unsustainable resource usage. 
4. Conclusions 
 The European energy market is dominated by horizontally and vertically integrated companies that register 
yearly profits above tens of billions Euros as a result of the permanent extension of their geographical area of 
activity, of their continuous diversification and enhancement of the customer number;  
 The main transformations of the Romanian energy system envisaged the vertical and horizontal separation, the 
introduction of competition at the generation and supply levels, the distribution privatization and price 
liberalization;  
 The determinant factors of the transformations occurred in our country’s energy system were the pressures put 
upon by the international financial institutions under the circumstances of European integration and Single 
Energy Market formation, the lack of coherency the national industrial and social policies on the one hand, and 
the national energy system attractiveness (the existing energy resources, the capacities’ structure, the energy 
quality, the customer number etc.), on the other hand. 
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 In electricity generation, the companies’ atomization and their participation on the spot market resulted in a 
competition growth and a reduction of the operation costs, doubled by the enhancement of transactional costs and 
a decrease of the individual companies’ investment capacity; 
 We noticed the precarious situation of the thermal-electrical utilities administered by the local councils, the losses 
registered by the foreign companies administering wind farms and the favorable financial situation of the 
historically well established companies (Hidroelectrica, Nuclearelectrica, Electrocentrale, energy complexes), 
with all injuries determined by the preferential contracts concluded with the energy suppliers;  
 In electricity transport, Transelectrica has, as always, a stable economic situation (international opening, qualified 
labor resources, the habitude to manage a sophisticated market as the energy one, a considerable investment 
capacity etc.); the company is listed on the Stock Market and thus it can benefit from the casino economy 
mechanisms. We emphasize that the financial market’s games can induce vulnerability on a company that has 
been for a such a long time stable;  
 In electricity distribution, all companies are profitable, but especially the foreign ones that recovered very fast the 
made “investments” in acquiring the majority stock. In the same time, they registered the most important labor 
reductions;  
 If at the generation level, the market structure determined the companies’ behavior and performances, in the case 
of competitive energy suppliers, their behavior, focused on short term profits, influenced the market 
structure(with no entry/exit barriers their number is continuously reducing along with the preferential contracts 
official exposure);  
 The suppliers’ market creation was institutionally unprepared and forced by interest parties. The regulation 
authority was not able to ensure transparency and monitor the suppliers’ activity in a such manner in order to 
transform this newly created energy component in a useful instrument for a real energy market opening;  
 The international re - dimensioning objectives followed through the distribution privatization, meaning the 
investment growth, the productivity enhancement, were not accomplished; 
 The Single Energy Market will lead to an increase of electricity prices for the households under the 
circumstances determined by their consumption level way below the European average, and the total lack of 
preoccupation for the convergence of Romanian population income with the European one.  
 
5. Some measures for the Romanian energy system re-dimensioning  
 The reconsideration of the energy policies towards the re-integration, at least horizontally of the energy 
companies. There are certain positive signals in this respect, as: a) the creation of the Oltenia energy complex 
through the merger of the Turceni, Rovinari and Craiova units and the respective mining utilities; b) the creation 
of Electrica Furnizare company through the merger of three implicit electricity suppliers with Romanian capital 
(Muntenia Nord, Transilvania Sud and Transilvania Nord). Under the question remains the purpose of those 
measures that invert the direction of the until now performed transformations in the energy field;  
 Unification, in a single organization, of the thermal and electrical utilities administered by the local councils in 
order to enhance their investment capacity and their market share, following the model of Federelettrica in Italy;  
 Merger of the domestic owned electricity companies with the ones activating on the natural gas market, in order 
to enhance their economic power necessary to penetrate the foreign markets;  
 Diversification of the services offered by the newly created integrated domestic companies, in the perspective of 
taking over new activities such as water and waste management and their active involvement in supplying energy 
services for the industrial companies and households;  
 Creation within the regulation authority, of an Energy Market Inspectorate, following the Swedish model, with 
the aim to monitor permanently the activity of all energy companies through thorough audits. This department 
should benefit from a young team, formed of few dedicated specialists in energy, finances and legislation;  
 Limitation through the establishment of maximum thresholds of the profits registered by the electricity suppliers; 
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 Creation, on the regulation authority’ web site of a data base destined for the electricity consumers, able to offer 
information regarding each supplier activating on the electricity market, their prices, the capital structure and 
profitability. In this respect, it should be enabled the obligation for the supplier companies to permanently 
actualize the data base;  
 Completion of the liberalization calendar with measures destined to the reduction of the disorder degree existing 
nowadays on the electricity suppliers’ market.  
 
The Romanian energy system transformation path was a pre-determined one, but maybe it is not too late to re-think 
its structure following the model of competitive European companies. 
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